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NOTE
The Smokescreen Problem in Abortion
Jurisprudence: How the Undue Burden
Standard and Long-Term Legislative
Tactics Allow Courts to Turn a Blind Eye to
True Legislative Intent
Lucy Downing*

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of abortion has been passionately debated in this country for
many years. For decades, our legal system has recognized that legitimate
interests in the subject lie with both women and the State.1 From the time the
right of free choice was found to be granted by our Constitution in Roe v.
Wade, however, the legal standard with which to assess these competing
interests has been a source of debate and confusion.2 Abortion is undoubtedly
an issue that implicates deeply rooted moral considerations for many people,
but the United States Supreme Court has carefully undertaken the
responsibility of formulating rules that insulate certain moral beliefs from
legal analyses of abortion.3
In Roe, the Court articulated the first standard used to assess abortion
regulations: the trimester framework.4 In short, this standard defined when
within a woman’s pregnancy a state may act and which purpose it may further
while doing so.5 Due to the rigidity of the trimester framework, the Court
articulated a new standard almost twenty years later in Planned Parenthood
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Editor, C Missouri Law Review, 20202021. I am grateful to Professor Oliveri for her insight, guidance, and support
during the writing of this Comment, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its
help in the editing process.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
2. Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How
the New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into a
Deferential Pike Test, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 402–406 (2019).
3. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
4. Id. at 164–65.
5. Id.
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: the undue burden standard.6 This
standard remains today and allows state regulation at any point in pregnancy,
so long as the regulation is not unduly burdensome to women seeking an
abortion.
The abortion debate has become more polarized since Roe, and state
legislatures have taken increasingly aggressive measures in limiting abortion
to the greatest extent possible under the existing legal framework.7 Further,
the undue burden standard set out in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey is unclear in many ways, specifically on how courts
should assess the burden of anti-abortion legislation when it offers no true
purpose other than to incrementally put an end to the abortion right.8 Indeed,
the standard has allowed many of these laws to pass constitutional muster.
Such a law may, under Casey, satisfy the undue burden test merely because
those challenging the law cannot prove definitively that it will actually unduly
burden women’s access before taking effect. In this way, the standard
essentially mandates that every law be challenged as applied, assuring that
there is no coherent framework or precedential value when the Supreme Court
strikes down a given restriction.9
This problem is compounded by the increase in discretionary state
agency action motivated by hostility toward the abortion right because the
undue burden standard fails to account for such behavior, no matter how
prevalent it may be in some states. District courts are in a position to tease
out improper legislative motives behind abortion restrictions, but the undue
burden standard allows courts of appeals to willfully ignore district court
findings that show improper legislative purpose and instead argue about
whether the law will impose an undue burden on access in effect. The
delegation of authority and discretion to state agencies, like the Missouri
Department of Health and Senior Services, for example, provides an
additional smokescreen that enables the courts to feign ignorance about the
true motivations behind certain restrictive and arbitrary laws.

6. 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
7. See Anna North, How Abortion Became a Partisan Issue in America,
MEDIA
(Apr.
10,
2019,
7:30
AM),
VOX
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/10/18295513/abortion-2020-roe-joe-bidendemocrats-republicans.
8. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, 878.
9. When assessing abortion regulations, courts differentiate between facial
and as-applied challenges. A facial challenge is “a claim that a statute is
unconstitutional on its face, [meaning] that it always operates unconstitutionally.”
Facial Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Thus, a facial
challenge to an abortion regulation may be brought before the regulation takes
effect. An as-applied challenge is a claim that a statute, though constitutional on
its face, is unconstitutional in effect because of “the facts of a particular case or []
its application to a particular party.” As-Applied Challenge, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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Some restrictive measures are motivated by legislatures’ legally
recognized and legitimate interests in protecting women’s health or protecting
potential life, but many measures are instead motivated by legislators’ moral
beliefs about abortion.10 The ability of courts to tease out the real motivation
behind a law restricting abortion depends on the effectiveness and propriety
of the legal standard used. Legal standards – in their formulation or
interpretation – can be skewed to value one side’s interests over the other’s,
to turn a blind eye to improper motivations behind restrictive laws, or to
disregard substantial burdens or benefits faced by one side. Indeed, these have
been complaints lodged against the legal standards that have been used to
review abortion cases.
With two newly appointed conservative justices, the Supreme Court
recently struck down another restrictive state abortion law, reiterating that the
undue burden standard is the proper test.11 This Note discusses how the undue
burden standard fails to meaningfully protect the abortion right in the current
polarized political climate. Part II outlines the relevant history of the legal
standards used in abortion cases. Part III illustrates a problematic
interpretation of the undue burden standard as it relates to the Supreme Court’s
most recent abortion-related decision in June Medical Services v. Russo. Part
IV then discusses how discretionary state agency action in states like Missouri
exacerbate the problems associated with the legal standard. Part V concludes
by reiterating how the undue burden standard has allowed for the gradual
destruction of the abortion right to near-nonexistence in states like Missouri.

II. RELEVANT ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE LEADING UP TO THE
UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
While the United States Supreme Court has decided many abortionrelated cases, this section outlines two major decisions that impact the
standard courts use to assess abortion regulations: Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.

A. Roe v. Wade
Roe v. Wade is a foundational decision within the United States Supreme
Court’s abortion jurisprudence. While courts no longer use the trimester
framework established in Roe, its essential holding that women have a
constitutional right to abortion and its careful examination of the

10. See North, supra note 7.
11. Amy Howe, Justices Grant New Cases or Upcoming Term, Will Tackle
Louisiana Abortion Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2019, 10:55 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/justices-grant-new-cases-for-upcomingterm-will-tackle-louisiana-abortion-dispute [https://perma.cc/N9TU-V4BF].
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countervailing interests involved in the abortion debate remain imbedded in
the standard used today.12
In the landmark 1973 decision, the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it a crime to procure or attempt an
abortion at any stage in pregnancy, except when necessary to preserve the
woman’s health.13 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the
concept of personal liberty found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate
her pregnancy.14 He noted, however, that this fundamental privacy right is
“not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation.”15 The Court held that, at certain points in pregnancy, legitimate
state interests become sufficiently compelling to allow for state regulation of
the right.16 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun emphasized that a regulation
limiting a fundamental right may be justified only by a compelling state
interest, and regulations “must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.”17
Justice Blackmun continued by analyzing the different state interests at
play in abortion legislation, their legitimacy, and when – if they are legitimate
– they may become sufficiently compelling to justify regulation.18 In
evaluating which interests a state may legitimately have in a woman’s
abortion decision, the Court looked to three historic justifications for the
enactment and continued existence of laws criminalizing abortion.19 First, the
Court found that some of these laws were historically meant to “deter illicit
sexual conduct.”20 The argument that this could remain an appropriate
purpose was quickly dismissed, and Texas did not argue that its criminal
statute was enacted with this purpose.21
Second, the Court noted that the purpose behind other historic criminal
abortion laws was to protect women from the hazards once associated with
the abortion procedure.22 Abortion mortality rates were high when most
criminal abortion statutes were enacted, especially prior to the development
of antibiotics in the 1940s, so some states criminalized abortion with the
purpose of shielding women from the dangers associated with the medical
12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79.
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
14. Id. at 153.
15. Id. at 154.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 155.
18. Id. at 162–63.
19. Id. at 147. Specifically, the Court looked into the history of criminal
abortion laws because such a law was at issue in the case. The Texas statute at
issue made it a crime to “procure” or attempt an abortion, unless the abortion was
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Id. at 117–18.
20. Id. at 148.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 148–49.
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procedure.23 However, Justice Blackmun stated that “modern medical
techniques” at the time of the opinion in 1973, rendered abortion procedures
at least as safe as childbirth – if not more so – especially when done within
the first trimester of pregnancy.24 Thus, “any interest of the State in protecting
the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure . . . [had] largely
disappeared” by the 1973 decision.25 The Court noted, however, that because
the risks associated with abortion increase as pregnancy continues, states
retain a legitimate interest in protecting women’s health and maintaining
medical standards in later-stage abortions.26 Thus, the Court found that a
state’s interest in women’s health becomes sufficiently compelling to justify
regulation after the end of the first trimester.27
Lastly, the Court examined a state’s interest in protecting life as a
purpose behind criminal abortion statutes.28 Some criminal abortion statutes
were enacted with the purpose of allowing states to carry out their general
interest in protecting the life of their citizens, under the assumption that life
begins at conception.29 However, Justice Blackmun rejected the notion that
states have a legitimate interest in protecting life at all stages of pregnancy.30
Without accepting the notion that life begins at conception, he instead held
that, “[i]n assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less
rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may
assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”31 The
Court then held that a state’s interest in potential life becomes compelling at
“viability,” meaning the point at which a fetus is capable of surviving outside
the womb.32
Thus, the Roe Court adopted what came to be known as the “trimester
framework” because, it argued, this was the best way to reconcile a woman’s
fundamental right to choose to have an abortion with competing legitimate
state interests.33 Implicit in the trimester framework is the Court’s recognition
of the notion that a state cannot legitimately further its interests in women’s
health or potential life when it has no reason to act. For example, the Court
looked to the general safety of early stage abortions in 1973 and stated that
any state interference purporting to further women’s health would not actually
be furthering a compelling state interest because abortion during the first

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 154.
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trimester may already be safer than childbirth.34 Thus, during this period, the
choice belongs solely to the woman and her physician without interference
from the state.35 After this period, a state may regulate pursuant to its interest
in women’s health, so long as the regulation is reasonably related to health.36
In pursuing its interest in potential life, a state may regulate only after
viability.37 The Court reasoned that, prior to viability, regulation enacted
pursuant to a state’s interest in potential life could not actually be furthering
that goal because the fetus is not yet capable of surviving outside the womb.38
After viability, a state may regulate or even ban abortion pursuant to its
interest in potential life.39
While the Court acknowledged that its trimester framework required
weighing state interests against a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy,40
the framework yielded a test more categorical than balancing in practice.41
Under the framework, viability determined whose interest prevailed, and any
burden on a woman’s fundamental right prior to certain compelling points
triggered a strict scrutiny approach, “requiring the government to justify any
regulation by showing the regulation was narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling government interest.”42
The Roe Court’s trimester framework, while rigid, created set
“categories” for when a state could actually be furthering a legitimate interest
for an important reason.43 While the boundaries of those categories may have
been rigid and seemingly arbitrary,44 the framework in essence created a
presumption of improper state purpose if the state legislated to address a
problem that did not exist. This standard, while strict, made it difficult for
states to legislate unless they had a valid reason to do so.45 Importantly, the
trimester framework laid out by the Roe Court acknowledged the presence of
hostility toward the abortion right and crafted a framework that attempted to
34. Id. at 149, 164.
35. Id. at 164.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 163.
39. Id. at 164–65
40. Id. at 164.
41. Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How
the New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into A
Deferential Pike Test, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 403–04 (2019).
42. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Abortion Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on Abortion
Choice and Otherwise Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L.R. 75, 80
(2015).
43. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56, 164–65.
44. Becca Kendis, Faute De Mieux: Recognizing and Accepting Whole
Woman’s Health for its Strengths and Weaknesses, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L.R. 1007,
1031 (Summer 2019).
45. See, e.g., id. at 1013.
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check such hostility as an impermissible purpose.46 Nineteen years later, in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a plurality of
justices indicated their willingness to adopt a less strict standard of review to
state abortion regulations.47

B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a
plurality of justices rejected the trimester framework from Roe, reasoning that
the framework both misconceived the pregnant woman’s interest and
undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.48 However, the plurality
emphasized that, while it was rejecting Roe’s trimester framework, it was
upholding a central principle of Roe: a woman has the constitutional right to
choose to have an abortion prior to viability.49 This privacy right, the Court
recognized, requires “particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted
to justify its abridgment.”50 However, the plurality found that the trimester
framework went too far in deeming all pre-viability state regulation
illegitimate.51 The Court reasoned that the framework’s objective – ensuring
that the woman’s right not be so subordinate to the State’s interest in
promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact – could still
be accomplished with a more lenient standard that would allow the state to
advance its legitimate interest in potential life prior to viability, an interest the
Court deemed another central principle of Roe.52
Thus, the plurality identified viability as the key point in which the
interests of the state and women shift.53 In doing so, the Court reiterated what
it considered Roe’s essential three-part holding: (1) before viability, a woman
has the right to choose to have an abortion without undue interference from
the State, (2) after viability, the State can restrict abortions if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the woman’s life or health, and (3)
“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child.”54 Thus, the Casey Court set forth a new “undue burden standard”
where a state may regulate pre-viability abortion pursuant to its interests in
women’s health and potential life from the outset of pregnancy, so long as it

46. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
47. Jon O. Shimabukuro, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative
Response 4, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2019).
48. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
49. Id. at 871.
50. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
51. Id. at 870, 872.
52. Id. at 872.
53. See id. at 879.
54. Id. at 846.
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did not amount to an undue burden.55 A finding of undue burden, the Court
clarified, “is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”56
In setting forth the new undue burden standard, the Casey plurality
focused on the test’s application to laws furthering the State’s interest in
potential life, as this was the purpose behind the informed consent, twentyfour-hour waiting period, and spousal notification provisions of the
Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case.57 The Court reasoned that, just
because a woman has the right to decide to have an abortion prior to viability,
it does not necessarily follow that a state should be prohibited from ensuring
that her choice is thoughtful and informed.58 In promoting its interest in
potential life, “throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure
that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this
interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”59 The plurality reiterated that
these measures must not, in purpose or effect, impose a substantial obstacle
on the woman’s right.60 Thus, under the undue burden standard, ensuring that
a woman’s choice is properly informed is a reasonable means for states to
further their legitimate interest in potential life so long as, the Court
emphasized, those means are solely calculated to inform her decision and not
hinder it.61
It is important to note the inherent contradiction in the Casey Court’s
articulation of its undue burden test. The Court said that the promotion and
protection of potential life is an acceptable state purpose, but at the same time
that a law should not have the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion.62 When protecting potential life by
definition involves trying to prevent abortion, this contradiction grants states
a legitimate interest that they may only partially further under the legal
standard; states may try to obstacle abortion, but not substantially.63
This contradiction motivates legislatures to enact gradual, more
insidious legislation designed to chip away at the abortion right until it no
55. Id. at 878.
56. Id. at 877.
57. Five provisions of a Pennsylvania statute were challenged in Casey: an
informed consent requirement, a waiting period provision requiring a woman to
receive certain information at least twenty-four hours before an abortion, a
parental informed consent requirement when a minor seeks an abortion, a spousal
notification requirement, and a provision exempting compliance with the other
provisions in the case of medical emergency. Id. at 844.
58. Id. at 872.
59. Id. at 878.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 877–78.
62. Id. at 877.
63. Id.
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longer exists at all.64 Indeed, anti-abortion legislators and activist groups have
used this interpretation of the undue burden standard to justify laws that
gradually chip away at the abortion right as part of a long-term strategy solely
aimed at ending the right completely.65 While the Roe and Casey Courts
emphasized the importance of carefully assessing the state purposes asserted
to justify abortion legislation, the Casey Court’s articulation of the test
muddies whether lower courts are actually required to conduct a purpose
inquiry.66 These long-term legislative strategies, and the true purpose behind
them, go unchecked as seemingly less-threatening individual laws are passed,
each making the obstacle imposed gradually more substantial.67
Applying the new undue burden test, the Casey Court upheld four out of
five of the provisions in question in the Pennsylvania law: a twenty-four-hour
waiting period requirement, an informed consent provision, a parental consent
provision, and the recordkeeping and reporting requirements.68 The court
noted that even though some of these regulations could delay access to an
abortion or make procuring one more expensive, the State did not impose an
undue burden in effect, and it was entitled to “enact persuasive measures
which favor childbirth over abortion.”69
Interestingly, even though the Court’s articulation of the rule appeared
to require a law to impose an undue burden neither in effect nor purpose, the
Court made relatively little inquiry into the State’s purpose behind the
provisions in question, and instead focused on whether the provisions created
an undue burden in effect.70 For example, in assessing the State’s purpose
behind the twenty-four-hour waiting requirement, the Court held the State’s
purpose to be valid because “in theory, at least, the waiting period [was] a
reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting life of the
unborn, a measure that [did] not amount to an undue burden.”71 Thus, the
Court assumed that because, theoretically, a waiting period requirement could
dissuade women from choosing to have an abortion, the State was acting with
a legitimate purpose.72
In assessing whether the waiting period requirement imposed an undue
burden on women’s access to abortion in effect, the Court looked at the district

64. Olga Khazan, Planning the End of Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July 16,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/what-pro-lifeactivists-really-want/398297 [https://perma.cc/68K9-8EFF].
65. Id.
66. Thomas Colby, The Other Half of the Abortion Right, 20 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1043, 1060 (2018)
67. Id. at 1045.
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883, 887, 899–900 (striking down the spousal
notification provision).
Id. at 886.
70. Id. at 877.
71. Id. at 885.
72. Id.
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court’s factual findings relating to the burden imposed by such a law.73 The
district court found that, “for those women who have the fewest financial
resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty
explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour
waiting period will be ‘particularly burdensome.’”74 However, the district
court did not make a finding on whether the burden was undue because it
never had a chance to address the issue.75
Using the trimester framework then still in place, the district court struck
down the waiting period requirement based on the state’s purpose, finding it
to be a regulation designed to promote the State’s interest in potential life
before viability, which was prohibited under the trimester framework.76 Thus,
the Court, looking at the record before it and the fact that the case involved a
facial challenge where burdens were not yet definitively proven, was not
convinced that the waiting period requirement imposed an undue burden.77 In
essence, the Court found that the requirement could theoretically further the
State’s interest in potential life and that there was not enough proof to show
that, prior to enforcement, the law would unduly burden women’s access.78
However, studies have since cast doubt on the accuracy of the Court’s
conclusions regarding the waiting period requirement.79 According to a 2009
literature review of scientific studies analyzing the impact of mandatory
counseling and waiting period laws, such requirements generally do not
succeed in changing the woman’s mind as Casey assumed, but instead impose
additional burdens on women that result in more out-of-state and late-term
abortions.80 The study compared the effects of Mississippi’s mandatory
counseling and waiting period law, which required an additional in-person
clinic visit before the procedure, with waiting period laws that allowed
counseling over the phone or Internet to avoid an additional clinic visit.81
After the Mississippi law took effect, abortion rates in the state fell, but more
women began going out-of-state for abortions, and the proportion of second
73. Id. at 885–86.
74. Id. at 886.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 887.
78. Id. at 886–87.
79. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion
Have Little Impact, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (May 12, 2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2009/most-laws-mandatingcounseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion-have-little-impact
[https://perma.cc/GU56-VP4T].
80. Theodore J. Joyce, et al., The Impact of State Mandatory Counseling and
Waiting Period Laws on Abortion: A Literature Review, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE
(April
2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/report/impact-state-mandatorycounseling-and-waiting-period-laws-abortion-literature-review
[https://perma.cc/7HD4-VAZL].
81. Id.
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trimester abortions increased.82 In contrast, abortion rates did not measurably
change in states where women were permitted to obtain the information
remotely and avoid a second clinic visit.83 Thus, whether the purpose behind
waiting period laws can actually be “calculated to inform the woman’s free
choice [and] not hinder it” is highly questionable when it has been shown that
the change in reproductive outcomes due to waiting period laws is more likely
a result of the burden of the requirement to certain women, not women
changing their minds after being required to take time to think about their
decision.84
Moreover, as the district court noted about the situation in Casey, studies
have shown that requiring that women make two trips to a clinic – one to
receive information, and another to complete the procedure at least twentyfour hours later – instead of one imposes additional burdens on some women,
forcing them to take more time off from work, arrange child care, or spend
additional money to travel.85 Further, the burden may be compounded by
other arbitrary targeted regulations of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”) in a
given state, such as those that require abortion facilities to meet ambulatory
surgical center (“ASC”) requirements or those that require physicians to
obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital.86 ASC and admitting privilege
requirements have caused many clinics to close in states like Missouri and
Texas.87 Closing clinics forces women to travel greater distances to the
nearest clinic.88 In these states, a requirement of two visits forces some
women to even arrange to stay away from home for one or more nights,
depending on the length of the waiting requirement, due to the great

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion
Have Little Impact, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (May 12, 2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2009/most-laws-mandatingcounseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion-have-little-impact
[https://perma.cc/CBX8-U249].
86. While abortion providers are already subject to strict evidence-based
regulations such as licensing requirements, federal workplace safety
requirements, association requirements and medical ethics, many states have
imposed additional regulations targeted specifically at abortion clinics that go
beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety. These laws have the primary
purpose of limiting access to abortion and are referred to as targeted regulations
of abortion providers, or TRAP laws. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers (TRAP) Laws, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Jan. 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/targeted-regulation-abortionproviders-trap-laws [https://perma.cc/7C2A-QS7M].
87. See id.
88. Id.
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distance.89 However, the burdensome effects of a given law are difficult to
definitively measure until after the restriction takes effect, making facial
challenges to laws with a clear purpose of ending the abortion right difficult
to bring in courts that focus the undue burden analysis on effect.90
In terms of laws furthering the State’s legitimate interest in women’s
health, the Casey plurality held that the State may enact regulations to further
this interest at any point in pregnancy.91 However, “[u]nnecessary health
restrictions that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle
to women impose an undue burden.”92 However, because the Court, in
application, did not give meaningful review to the State’s purpose of potential
life, some lower courts began to apply less scrutiny in the health restriction
context, where impermissible purpose is arguably more clear. This illustrates
a twofold issue with Casey’s undue burden test: (1) its analysis sets up
acceptable purposes that are in direct conflict with one another and (2) it
assumes a case-by-case analysis is necessary, which guarantees endless legal
battles because every state is different.

III. HOW THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD IS UNCLEAR: A LOOK
INTO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION BEFORE AND AFTER
WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
of the Casey test illustrates the contradictory and confusing nature of the
undue burden test and how it can ignore hostile legislative tactics. Further,
the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the undue burden test to be a state-specific
analysis, rendering any clarification from the Supreme Court on what
constitutes an undue burden distinguishable. The Fifth Circuit’s recent
abortion decisions involving the undue burden standard are of particular
relevance here because its articulation of the standard has made its way to the
Supreme Court on two separate occasions within the last ten years.
In June Medical Services v. Kliebert, a district court within the Fifth
Circuit invalidated a Louisiana law requiring physicians to have admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the facility where they perform
abortions, holding that the law posed an undue burden in effect.93 The Fifth
Circuit then reversed, holding that the law was not an undue burden under its

89. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion
Have Little Impact, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (May 12, 2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2009/most-laws-mandatingcounseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion-have-little-impact
[https://perma.cc/3BW4-9Q8W].
90. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
91. Id. at 878.
92. Id.
93. 158 F. Supp.3d 473, 573 (M.D. La. 2016).
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interpretation of the standard.94 Later that year, in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and struck down a
facially-identical Texas law, holding the admitting privilege requirement in
that case was an undue burden because it did nothing to benefit women’s
health but instead made abortions much less accessible to women.95
In light of Whole Woman’s Health, the Fifth Circuit then remanded June
Medical Services to the district court for additional factfinding on the
admitting privileges law in Louisiana.96 The district court again invalidated
the law as unduly burdensome, finding that the law at issue was facially
identical to the Texas law invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health and similarly
furthered no health benefit.97 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court again and dismissed the case, holding that there was at least a minimal
benefit and the burden was not undue, contrary to the district court’s extensive
findings.98 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, again taking issue with the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis.99 These cases and their implications are more fully discussed below.

A. The Initial District Court Decision: June Medical Services v.
Kliebert
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden test further
illustrates the problems with the standard.100 In January 2016, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana was asked in June
Medical Services v. Kliebert to invalidate a Louisiana law requiring
physicians to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the
facility where they perform abortions.101 With Judge deGravelles writing the
majority opinion, the district court applied what the Fifth Circuit had
previously deemed to be Casey’s two-pronged test: (1) the law must be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and (2) the law must not have

94. June Meds. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2016),
vacated 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016).
95. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318, 2320 (2016).
96. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, No. 16-30116, 2016 WL 11494731, at
*1 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2016).
97. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 89 (M.D. La.
2017), rev’d sub nom. June Med Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 727 (5th Cir.
2018), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L. L. C.v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103(2020).
98. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019), rev’d sub nom.
June Med. Servs. L.L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion).
99. June Med. Servs., L.L.C., v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020)
(plurality opinion).
100. June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 158 F.Supp.3d 473, 482–83 (2016).
101. Id. at 484.
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the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking a pre-viability abortion.102
In assessing the first prong, the district court followed Fifth Circuit
precedent that admitting privileges are rationally related to women’s health
and found the first prong to be satisfied.103 The district court then assessed
the second prong, making a twofold inquiry into both the law’s purpose and
effect.104 In examining a law’s purpose, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of
the rule assumes a valid purpose unless the regulation serves no purpose other
than to make obtaining abortions more difficult.105 In other words, the
purpose prong is satisfied as long as the purpose of the law is not solely to
impose an undue burden.106 The burden is on the plaintiff to show
impermissible purpose, and the court noted that district courts within the Fifth
Circuit are not allowed to weigh benefits against burdens under the test.107
Here, the district court found that one purpose of the admitting privileges law
was to further women’s health, but that another purpose of the law was to
make it more difficult for physicians to perform legal abortions and therefore
restrict women’s access.108 Because there was at least one permissible
purpose behind the law, the district court found the purpose prong to be
satisfied.109
The district court then found that the law imposed an undue burden under
the effects prong of its undue burden analysis.110 Under the effects prong, the
law must not have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking pre-viability abortions.111 Here, the district court made
extensive factual findings showing that doctors likely would not be able to
obtain admitting privileges, and that this would cause an undue burden on
women’s access.112 At the time of the case, five out of the six abortion
providers in Louisiana had made good faith efforts to obtain admitting
privileges but were unable to do so because hospitals would either ignore their
applications until they automatically lapsed or deny applications because of
the doctors’ statuses as abortion providers.113 The remaining doctor testified
that he would be forced to stop performing legal abortions if he became the
sole provider in the state.114 Logistically, the doctor would not be able to

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 524.
Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 517–22.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 499.
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accommodate all Louisiana women seeking abortions.115 Further, that doctor
had already received intense threats from activist groups that would worsen if
he became the only doctor for groups to focus on.116 Thus, the district court
invalidated the law because it posed an undue burden in effect.117

B. The Supreme Court Speaks on the Standard: Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt
Later in 2016, the Supreme Court, in Whole Woman’s Health, addressed
the propriety of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the undue burden test and
applied it to two Texas laws, an admitting-privileges requirement facially
identical to the Louisiana admitting-privileges requirement at issue in Kleibert
and a surgical center requirement.118 The Court waited to address the
requirements until after they were allowed to go into effect but ultimately
invalidated both as violations of the undue burden standard under Casey.119
When the case was first brought, before the law took effect, the Court refused
to hear the case on the grounds that it was not ripe – without seeing the impact
that the TRAP laws would have, the Court said it could not determine whether
there was an undue burden.120 It was only after the law took effect and half
the clinics closed that the Court was willing to take the case back up again.121
The admitting-privilege provision at issue required abortion-providing
physicians to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the
abortion facility, and the surgical-center provision required abortion facilities
to meet the minimum standards under Texas law for ambulatory surgical
centers.122 The Court, with Justice Breyer writing for the majority, held that
each restriction placed an undue burden on women’s access to abortion and
invalidated both provisions.123
In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer began by clarifying certain
aspects of the undue burden test required by Casey, specifically by explaining
how the standard used by the Fifth Circuit was incorrect.124 The Fifth
Circuit’s test found a state law constitutional “if: (1) it [did] not have the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it [was] reasonably related
to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.”125 Justice Breyer

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 531.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 2306.
Id.
Id. at 2300.
Id.
Id. at 2309.
Id.
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critiqued the first component for its focus on the burden imposed without
including the relevant inquiry into whether the law furthers the State interest
via a medical benefit, reasoning that “the rule announced in Casey, however,
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer.”126 The Court also clarified that
rational basis review was incorrect: “[It] is wrong to equate the judicial review
applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty
with the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation
is at issue.”127
In invalidating the admitting-privileges requirement, Justice Breyer first
noted that “there was no significant health-related problem that the new law
helped to cure,” citing evidence in the record of the particularly low rates of
complications and virtually nonexistent deaths in Texas due to abortions.128
Moreover, there was no evidence in the record showing that the new
requirement would have helped women obtain better treatment.129 Because
there was no evidence of any health benefit resulting from the new
requirement, the Court found that the law did not further the State’s legitimate
interest in protecting women’s health.130 Moreover, the Court stated that
federal district courts have found other states’ admitting-privileges
requirements to lack health benefits for similar reasons.131
Furthermore, Breyer made the second point that, not only does the
requirement have virtually no benefit, but “the record evidence indicates that
the admitting-privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman’s choice,’” citing language from Casey.132 Texas hospitals
conditioned admitting privileges on physicians meeting a certain number of
admissions per year.133 However, abortions in Texas were so safe that patients
rarely needed a hospital visit related to the procedure, so physicians were
almost never able to meet the requirement for admitting privileges.134 After
the requirement went into effect, the number of abortion facilities dropped in
half due to the difficulty involved in physicians obtaining admitting
privileges.135 This resulted in “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding.”136 There was also evidence in the record that the
closures resulted in increased driving distances for women to procure an
abortion, with the restrictions causing the number of women living more than

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 2310.
Id. at 2310–11.
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2312.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2313.
Id.
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150 miles from an abortion facility to increase by hundreds of thousands.137
The Court acknowledged that, while increased driving distances do not always
rise to the level of placing an undue burden on access, when taken
cumulatively with the other burdens and weighed against the complete lack of
health benefits, the law created an undue burden.138
For similar reasons related to the lack of a health benefit and the extent
of the burden imposed, the Court also invalidated the surgical-center
requirement.139 First, the Court, citing the extensive district court findings,140
found that the restriction provided women with no real health benefit.141
Because Texas already had extensive safety regulations in place for abortion
clinics, the surgical-center requirement made no appreciable difference in
safety.142 Moreover, Texas allowed procedures statistically riskier than
abortion, like colonoscopies, liposuctions, and at-home childbirth overseen by
a midwife, to take place outside of hospitals without requiring those facilities
to be certified as surgical centers.143 The Court also noted that there was
extensive evidence in the record to support that the restriction provided no real
health benefit, and there was no evidence to the contrary.144 When weighed
against the burden of forcing more clinics to close because of the difficulty in
surgical-center certification, the Court found the requirement imposed an
undue burden on abortion access.145

C. The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis after Whole Woman’s Health
While Whole Woman’s Health was considered a victory for many prochoice advocates, its precedential value was limited: the Court treated the
challenge to Texas’s law as an as-applied challenge.146 It did not strike down
all admitting privileges requirements or all surgical center certification
requirements as unduly burdensome, just those in Texas in light of the number
of clinics that had to close and the increased driving distances imposed on
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2316.
140. Id. at 2315.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (Explaining the total number of deaths in Texas from abortions was
five in the period from 2001 to 2012, or about one out of about 120,000 to 144,000
abortions. Nationwide, childbirth is fourteen times more likely than abortion to
result in death, but Texas law allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in the
patient’s own home. Colonoscopy, a procedure that typically takes place outside
a hospital (or surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate ten times higher than an
abortion. The mortality rate for liposuction, another outpatient procedure, is
twenty-eight times higher than the mortality rate for abortion.).
144. Id. at 2316.
145. Id. at 2317–18.
146. Id. at 2305.
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women in that state.147 The problem with the limited nature of this holding is
illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s reconsideration of Kleibert in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health.
On remand, the district court laid out a new test in accordance with
Whole Woman’s Health.148 Under the new test, a restriction must be shown
to actually further its purported interest, and it is constitutional only if its
benefits outweigh its burdens, as outlined by Whole Woman’s Health.149 The
district court, with Judge deGravelles again writing the opinion, granted a
permanent injunction on the admitting privileges requirement, finding that
any minimal benefit of the law did not outweigh its substantial burdens.150
In rendering this decision, the district court made extensive findings of
fact showing that the admitting privilege requirement was not relevant to the
standard of care provided to patients, it provided no benefits to women’s
health, and it was an inapt remedy for a problem that did not exist.151 The
district court further found that the requirement would likely cause at least
three of the six abortion clinics in Louisiana to close, which would cause all
women seeking an abortion in Louisiana to face greater obstacles, with
additional burdensome effects for several significant subgroups of women in
Louisiana.152 Thus, after making extensive factual findings and weighing the
minimal – if not nonexistent – benefits of the law against its significant
burdens, the district court found the burden to be undue and the law facially
unconstitutional.153
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit again reversed the district court’s decision
and dismissed the case, with Circuit Judge Smith writing the majority
opinion.154 The court held that the factual situation in Louisiana was different
from the situation in Texas contemplated by the Supreme Court in Whole
Woman’s Health.155 Even though the laws were facially identical, the court
found that the law, while declared an undue burden in Texas, would not
amount to such a burden in Louisiana.156 The court interpreted Casey and
Whole Woman’s Health to mean that “even regulations with a minimal benefit
are unconstitutional only where they present a substantial obstacle to
abortion.”157

147.
148.
2017).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 2297.
June Medical Services LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 33 (M.D. La
Id. at 32.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 88–89.
June Med. Srvs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 791.
Id.
Id. at 803.
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The court found that the law conferred at least a minimal benefit, citing
legislative testimony showing that there was a difference in the credentialing
function between clinics and hospitals.158 Unlike in Texas where the
requirement yielded no additional benefit because abortion clinics were
already under strict safety regulations, the Fifth Circuit found that abortion
clinic credentialing in Louisiana was not as rigorous as the process used by
hospitals.159 Specifically, the record showed evidence that Louisiana abortion
clinics, apart from requiring physicians to be medically licensed, did not
inquire into physician competency or perform background checks, whereas
hospitals did.160 Moreover, evidence also showed that the requirement was
not targeting abortion procedures while leaving riskier procedure providers
free from the requirement, as was the case in Whole Woman’s Health.161
Instead, the court found that the requirement sought to subject abortion
providers to the same standards that apply to physicians providing similar
types of services in outpatient surgery centers.162 While the court held that
there was evidence that the Louisiana law would yield some benefit, it
acknowledged that the benefit was minor.163
Thus, the court found that the law was addressing a problem unique to
Louisiana and bringing abortion physicians up to a baseline standard required
of other physicians.164 This reasoning is problematic, however, because the
court of appeals attached a benefit to fixing the difference in credentialing in
the face of the district court’s explicit finding that fixing the difference
provided no benefit and addressed no real problem.165 The district court found
that abortion procedures were already extremely safe in Louisiana, as they
were in Texas in Whole Woman’s Health, and abortion providers’ competency
was not an issue in Louisiana.166 However, the court of appeals disregarded
the district court’s findings on this point and deferred to legislative statements
asserting a need for the law to protect women’s health.167
The court of appeals further distinguished the situation in Louisiana from
Texas in Whole Woman’s Health by finding the law to be less burdensome in
Louisiana than Texas.168 The court said that it was unclear whether the
admitting privileges requirement would actually cause clinics to close in
Louisiana because some of the doctors’ applications had not yet been

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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168.

Id. at 805.
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officially denied, so the doctors could still theoretically obtain privileges.169
However, the district court explicitly found that hospitals were purposely
letting the applications sit without formally denying them because Louisiana
allows for automatic denial if a hospital never addresses an application.170
In summary, the Fifth Circuit stated that the law would result in a
potential increased waiting time of fifty-four minutes for, at most, thirty
percent of women.171 In its holding, the court found that this burden was not
“substantial” under Whole Woman’s Health, and concluded that the statute
should be upheld in light of the minimal benefit it would confer.172
However, the dissent in the Fifth Circuit case, written by Circuit Judge
Higginbotham, found that the court failed to give meaningful review to the
burdens and benefits alleged to be conferred by the law due to its disregard of
the district court’s findings.173 According to the dissent, the law would confer
no real health benefit because, prior to the law’s passage, abortion physicians
were required to have a written transfer agreement with a physician who did
have admitting privileges to a local hospital.174 Thus, the only “benefit” the
law would confer to women is that, if they require hospital care in the event
of a complication, which is already a very low percentage of cases, they would
be able to have continuity of care with their original abortion physician.175
However, there was no evidence in the district court record that suggested
women would receive a lesser standard of care in the event of such a
transfer.176
Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority’s acceptance of the law’s
credentialing function as a health benefit, as the district court made no such
finding.177 The majority rested this finding of benefit on the testimony of one
doctor who was responsible for hiring physicians at one of the clinics and had
previously been on a hospital committee that assessed admitting privilege
applications.178 In his testimony, the doctor described the different hiring
procedures the majority discussed.179 However, the dissent criticized the
majority for attaching a benefit to addressing that difference when no evidence
of such benefit was on the record.180 Moreover, there was no evidence on the
record that any physician at an abortion facility had been hired with a criminal
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Id. at 815.
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Id. at 817.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818–19.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/10

20

Downing: The Smokescreen Problem in Abortion Jurisprudence: How the Undue

2020]

THE SMOKESCREEN PROBLEM IN ABORTION LAW

1159

record or without the proper competency.181 Thus, the dissent argued that,
like in Whole Woman’s Health, the restriction does not actually further the
State’s interest in women’s health or proper credentialing because these were
not issues to begin with.182
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s view that the law would
not be an undue burden on abortion access.183 The district court made
extensive findings on the likelihood that the six abortion providers in
Louisiana would be able to obtain admitting privileges.184 The court found
that only one doctor would be able to obtain admitting privileges, and this
would result in the inability of approximately seventy percent of the 9,976
women seeking abortions in Louisiana annually to obtain one.185 This was
the district court’s more conservative finding of harm, as it made an
alternative finding of more substantial harm in the likely event that the last
remaining abortion provider would quit due to fear of being the only abortion
provider in the state.186 Thus, weighing the likelihood of substantial harm
against the lack of health benefit using the evidentiary findings of the district
court, the dissent found this to be a clear undue burden on abortion access.187
In October 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of June
Medical Services and address the constitutionality of the Louisiana admitting
privileges requirement, its first substantive abortion case since the addition of
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh.188 The future of abortion
jurisprudence now substantially depends on the make-up of the Court.189
Now, three years after Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy are no longer on the bench, and Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Kavanaugh have taken their places, respectively.190 Prior to Kavanaugh’s
appointment, some scholars noted the specific importance of Kennedy’s
position on the Court in terms of Whole Woman’s Health’s power because of
the importance of his vote to uphold Roe’s essential holding in the Casey
plurality.191 Indeed, his retirement could place abortion rights in a much more
precarious position.192 Many have speculated about how the new Supreme
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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Id. at 819.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 827.
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Id. at 829.
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Abortion Case from Louisiana,
YORK
TIMES
(Oct.
4,
2019),
NEW
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/us/politics/supreme-court-abortionlouisiana.html [https://perma.cc/JFK3-KGJQ].
189. John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future
of Abortion Regulation, 7 UC IRVINE L. R. 623, 643–44 (December 2017).
190. Liptak, supra note 188.
191. Robertson, supra note 189, at 643–44.
192. Robertson, supra note 189, at 643–44.
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Court composition will impact the future of abortion rights, but a definitive
answer is imminent.

D. June Medical Services: Another Clarification from the Supreme
Court
In June Medical Services v. Russo, Justice Breyer wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.193 In addressing
the merits of the case, the majority first reiterated the proper standard for
assessing abortion regulations: “a statute which, while furthering a valid state
interest has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends.”194 Further, “unnecessary health regulations impose an undue burden if
they have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion.”195 Importantly, the Court emphasized, reiterating
language from Whole Woman’s Health, that “courts must consider the burdens
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws
confer.”196
Noting that the Court of Appeals did not take issue with the legal
standard used by the District Court so much as the factual findings it used in
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that “a district court’s findings of
fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”197 This standard is
highly deferential, and a court of appeals may not reverse a plausible account
of the evidence given the record, even if it would have weighed the evidence
differently if it had been sitting as the trier of fact.198
With that standard in mind, the majority then carefully assessed whether
the District Court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that the
Louisiana admitting privileges law is unconstitutional.199 In terms of the
law’s asserted benefits to women’s health, the Court pointed to the following
district court findings:
•

193.
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Abortion in Louisiana was already “extremely safe, with
particularly low rates of serious complications” prior to the law’s
passage. Further, testimony of clinic staff and physicians showed
that less than one per several thousand patients ever required
transfer to a hospital, and “whether or not a patient’s treating
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physician has admitting privileges is not relevant to the patient’s
care.”200
•

There was no evidence in the record showing a significant healthrelated problem that the new law would help to cure: there was no
evidence of improper treatment of abortion complications or that
requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges would
help avoid any negative outcomes.201

The Court then looked to the district court’s findings on the law’s
burdensome effects:
•

“Approximately 10,000 women obtain abortions in Louisiana
every year[,]” and “those women were served by six doctors at
five abortion clinics” at the outset of the litigation. By the time
the district court rendered its second decision, there were five
doctors and three clinics remaining.202

•

Despite the good faith efforts of the five doctors to obtain
admitting privileges in order to comply with the law, they had
“very limited success for reasons related to [the law] and not
related to their competence.”203

•

The doctors’ inability to obtain admitting privileges was caused
by the new law “working in concert with existing laws and
practices, including hospital bylaws and criteria that preclude or,
at least greatly discourage, the granting of privileges to abortion
providers.”204

•

It is unlikely that the clinics would be able to recruit new
physicians who have or could obtain admitting privileges.205

Enforcing the admitting privileges requirement would therefore
“reduc[e] the number of clinics to one, or at most two, and leav[e] only one,
or at most two, physicians providing abortions in the entire state.”206
Taken together, the evidence shows that the law “does not advance
Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting the health of women seeking
abortions. Instead, [the law] would increase the risk of harm to women’s

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 2114–15.
Id. at 2115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2115–16.
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health by dramatically reducing the availability of safe abortion in
Louisiana.”207
The Court also noted that the district court found no distinction between
this case and Whole Woman’s Health because the Louisiana law was modeled
after the Texas admitting privileges requirement and they both operate by
imposing “significant obstacles to abortion access with no countervailing
benefits.”208
The Court concluded that, in light of the record, “the District Court’s
significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have
ample evidentiary support” and “none is ‘clearly erroneous.’”209 The majority
further concluded that “[t]his case is similar to, nearly identical with, Whole
Woman’s Health. And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion.
Act 620 is unconstitutional.”210
In both June Medical Services and Whole Woman’s Health, the laws in
question were ostensibly enacted out of the States’ interest in safeguarding
women’s health. Thus, these types of laws are commonly referred to as
“health restrictions.”211 Indeed, stemming from Roe and rearticulated
specifically in Casey, states have a legitimate interest in preserving women’s
health from the outset of pregnancy.212 However, many scholars have noted
that Whole Woman’s Health significantly diminished the validity of health
restrictions due to the Court’s recognition that abortion is generally a much
safer procedure today than it was in the Roe era.213 June Medical Services
now bolsters that conclusion. It follows, then, that states likely can no longer
justify health restrictions “rely[ing] on general claims regarding the dangers
of abortion.”214
In June Medical Services, Louisiana seemed to address this issue by
citing an existing gap in abortion facility regulations that the health restriction
would alleviate.215 This was successful with the Fifth Circuit majority.216 The
court reasoned that, unlike in Whole Woman’s Health where the State showed
no evidence of health benefit, Louisiana had at least provided some evidence
that “the admitting privileges requirement performs a real, and previously
unaddressed, credentialing function that promotes the well-being of women

207. Id. at 2116.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2132.
210. Id. at 2133.
211. John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future
of Abortion Regulation, 7 UC IRVINE L. R. 623, 645 (December 2017).
212. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
213. Robertson, supra note 211, at 645; Becca Kendis, Faute De Mieux:
Recognizing and Accepting Whole Woman’s Health for its Strengths and
Weaknesses, 69 CASE W. RES. L.R. 1007, 1027 (Summer 2019).
214. Kendis, supra note 213, at 1025.
215. June Med. Srvs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 807 (2018).
216. Id. at 813.
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seeking abortion.”217 However, the court differed from Casey and Whole
Woman’s Health, as the dissent noted, in assuming the additional regulation
would actually provide a benefit to women’s health, which the district court
specifically found it did not.218 In Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical
Services, the Court emphasized the constitutional duty imposed on courts in
reviewing factual findings when constitutional rights are at stake. The Court’s
thorough analysis of the lower court’s findings and records in both cases
further supports this duty.219

IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STATE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS: A LOOK
INTO MISSOURI
The Missouri Legislature has delegated broad authority to the
Department of Health and Senior Services (“DHSS”) in regulating abortion
facilities. However, Missouri lawmakers have used DHSS to make obtaining
an abortion more difficult in Missouri.

A. Adding on to the Smokescreen: Delegations of Authority to
Missouri Agencies and Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski
The Supreme Court’s state-specific analysis of state TRAP laws
becomes even more complicated when a state delegates the authority to
regulate abortion to an agency that exercises broad authority.220 In Missouri,
for example, a state that has a codified legislative intent to restrict abortion to
the fullest extent possible,221 the legislature has given broad authority to
DHSS in regulating abortion facilities.222 DHSS is tasked with adopting rules,
regulations, and standards by which abortion facilities must abide;223 issuing
217. Id. at 806.
218. Id. at 816 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
219. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
220. Rosemary Westwood, How State Health Departments Are Closing
Abortion Clinics: Five Key Takeaways, PACIFIC STANDARD, Jul. 31, 2019,
https://psmag.com/news/how-state-health-departments-are-closing-abortionclinics-five-key-takeaways.
221. MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (West 2019) (“In recognition that Almighty
God is the author of life, that all men and women are ‘endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life’, and that article I,
section 2 of the Constitution of Missouri provides that all persons have a natural
right to life, it is the intention of the general assembly of the state of Missouri to:
(1) Defend the right to life of all humans, born and unborn; (2) Declare that the
state and all of its political subdivisions are a “sanctuary of life” that protects
pregnant women and their unborn children; and (3) Regulate abortion to the full
extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.”).
222. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 197.225–197.230 (West 2017).
223. MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.225 (West 2017).
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licenses, without which abortion facilities may not operate;224 and conducting
on-site inspections and investigations of facilities “as it deems necessary.”225
Additionally, the legislature requires DHSS to conduct unannounced on-site
inspections and investigations of abortion facilities at least once a year.226
While much of the statutory language relating to the licensing of medical
treatment facilities refers to both abortion facilities and ambulatory surgical
centers, this on-site, unannounced investigation requirement is specific only
to abortion facilities.227
DHSS’s discretionary treatment of abortion facilities has been the
subject of several lawsuits within the last five years.228 In July 2015, the
Missouri Senate convened the Interim Committee on the Sanctity of Life to
investigate Planned Parenthood’s presence in Missouri.229 The Committee
focused on the licensing of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and MidMissouri’s (“PPKM”) Columbia, Missouri facility and the hospital admitting
privileges held by the sole physician performing abortions there. Missouri
law requires physicians who perform abortions at an abortion facility to obtain
admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen minutes of the facility in order
for the facility to receive a license from DHSS.230 The Committee determined
that PPKM’s physician held privileges at University of Missouri Health Care
under the hospital’s “refer and follow” category of privileges.231
In August 2015, then-Senator and Chairman of the Committee on
Sanctity of Life Kurt Schaefer, sent a letter to the University of Missouri
Chancellor reminding him that the University, a publicly funded entity in a
state with citizens who “have gone to great lengths to ensure that their
taxpayer dollars never enable abortion services,” received half of one billion
taxpayer dollars from the State of Missouri the previous year.232 He cautioned
that the University’s agreement with PPKM’s physician was “a matter of
substantial public interest and concern.”233 Senator Schaefer, also a member
of the Senate Appropriates Committee, further cautioned that the University
may be in violation of Missouri law prohibiting the use of public funds for the
assistance or promotion of abortion procedures.234

224. Id. at § 197.205.)
225. Id. at § 197.230 (West 2017).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, 2016 WL 2745873
(W.D. Mo. 2016); Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v.
Hawley, 903 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2018).
229. Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, 2016 WL 2745873, at *2
(W.D. Mo. 2016).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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In response, the University announced on September 24 that it would
eliminate the “refer and follow” category of privileges held by PPKM’s
physician effective December 1.235 The following day, DHSS Administrator
John Langston sent a letter to PPKM stating that the facility’s license would
be revoked effective December 1 if the facility’s physician did not obtain
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital by then.236 On November 25,
Langston sent PPKM another letter stating that DHSS had not received
confirmation that PPKM was able to satisfy the admitting privileges
requirement essential to its license and that DHSS would now revoke the
center’s license effective close of business on November 30.237
After PPKM obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent DHSS from
revoking their facility license in November, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri assessed the propriety of a permanent
injunction in April 2016 in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski.238
The District Court granted the permanent injunction, and Judge Laughrey,
writing for the majority, found that DHSS, in denying PPKM’s license,
violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating PPKM more harshly than
other similarly situated ASCs.239
Missouri law outlines a procedure for DHSS to follow when a facility is
found not to be in compliance with licensing requirements. The procedure
generally involves DHSS identifying a deficiency, notifying the facility of the
deficiency, undergoing a course of communication with the facility that
allows the facility time and opportunity to implement a plan of correction to
address the deficiency, and then deciding whether license revocation is
appropriate.240 Judge Laughrey noted that PPKM was not given an
opportunity to implement a plan of correction before DHSS revoked its
license, and “[o]ther than the PPKM revocation that is the subject of this
litigation, there is no instance in DHSS records involving an ASC license
revocation without a plan of correction being put in place first.”241
Judge Laughrey further noted that DHSS had rarely revoked ASC
licenses, with only one other instance of DHSS attempting to revoke such a
license found in the record.242 In that case, DHSS identified numerous serious
deficiencies that posed “significant threats to patient health and safety” at the
Surgical Center of Creve Coeur (“SCCC”), including failing to ensure that
drugs used at the center were securely maintained, allowing untrained nurses
to provide conscious sedation, failing to follow acceptable infection control
standards, and failing to ensure that its nursing staff was aware of the location

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *7, *10.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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of the emergency resuscitative equipment.243 Despite these egregious
deficiencies, SCCC was allowed to retain its license during the period of
deficiency and submit several plans of correction over the course of two
years.244 DHSS made a “substantial effort with SCCC to remedy the
deficiencies, involving numerous back and forth communications with
SCCC.”245 After DHSS worked with SCCC for years to try to correct the
serious deficiencies with no success, DHSS then made the decision to revoke
the center’s license.246
In contrast, DHSS made the decision to revoke PPKM’s license based
on a single impending deficiency without soliciting a plan of correction or
allowing PPKM time to address the deficiency.247 Instead, “DHSS informed
PPKM that it had made its decision about how to address the deficiency, and
planned to revoke the center’s license as soon as the deficiency arose.”248
DHSS admitted that, unlike SCCC, PPKM’s failure to obtain admitting
privileges presented no immediate threat to patient health or welfare because
PPKM stopped performing abortions when its physician’s hospital privileges
expired.249 The court found DHSS’s disparate treatment of SCCC and PPKM
irrational because “[t]here is no question that SCCC’s safety deficiencies
made the center less deserving of DHSS leeway in developing and
implementing a plan of correction than does PPKM’s single deficiency, which
DHSS admits presents no immediate threat to patient welfare.”250 Yet SCCC
was given significantly more opportunities to communicate with DHSS than
PPKM, and the court found this type of irrational disparate treatment violative
of the Equal Protection Clause.251
Further, “PPKM had no deficiency at the time DHSS sent its September
25 and November 25 notices,” and DHSS had never undertaken a prospective
analysis of impending deficiencies prior to PPKM, according to the record.252
The court found that “such hasty action is not contemplated by the
enforcement statute.”253
Further, Judge Laughrey found that “DHSS’s unprecedented hasty
actions were likely the result of political pressure being exerted by Missouri
legislators and the Department’s perception that if it did not act in accordance
with the legislature’s desires, its budget would be cut.”254 Mr. Langston
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suggested that DHSS feared financial retaliation from Senator Schaefer, as a
member of the Senate Appropriates Committee, if it did not “act in accordance
with the senator’s goals.”255
While Mr. Langston, who would normally be in charge of drafting and
overseeing plans of corrections, sent the notices to PPKM, they were drafted
by higher-ups in this case, which was unlike DHSS’s normal practices.256 All
decisions about plans of correction are generally made by “bureau-level”
DHSS employees who conduct ASC surveys, such as Mr. Langston, so the
court noted that the involvement of the DHSS Director and Office of the
Governor in PPKM’s case was unusual and indicated that the course of action
taken resulted from animus towards PPKM as an abortion facility.257 Judge
Laughrey found that DHSS’s disparate treatment of PPKM “[could not] be
justified by political pressure or public opposition to PPKM,” and that the
concept of equal protection dictates that “a bare [legislative] desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest.”258

B. Illustrating the Problems with a State-Specific Analysis:
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley
While Judge Laughrey’s holding in Lyskowski checked improper state
agency action motivated by animus towards abortion facilities, the same
animus has gone unchecked in other lawsuits involving DHSS due to the
application of the undue burden standard.259 Comprehensive Health of
Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, an opinion written by Judge
Shepherd of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is one
example.260 In that case, Comprehensive Health and Reproductive Health
Services of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (“RHS”), together
representing every facility that provided or sought to provide abortions in
Missouri,261 sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of
the Missouri legislature’s 2007 statutory amendment to the definition of
ambulatory surgical centers to include abortion facilities.262
The amendment resulted in a statutory requirement that all physicians
performing abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen

255. Id. at *12.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *7.
258. Id. at *1.
259. See Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v.
Hawley, 903 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2018).
260. See id.
261. Id. at 754 (“Comprehensive Health operates facilities in Kansas City and
Columbia, and RHS operates a facility in St. Louis and has plans to operate in
Springfield and Joplin.”).
262. Id.
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minutes of the facility, the same type of restriction at issue in Whole Woman’s
Health and June Medical Services.263 Additionally, pursuant to its authority
to enact health and safety regulations for abortion facilities, DHSS
subsequently adopted regulations that specify physical design and layout
requirements for abortion facilities performing surgical abortions, known as
physical plant regulations.264 These regulations include a waiver provision
allowing facilities to waive the requirements, pending a written request and
DHSS approval of the waiver.265 Comprehensive Health and RHS challenged
both the admitting privileges requirement and the physical plant regulations
on substantive due process and equal protection grounds, arguing that Whole
Woman’s Health made both laws unconstitutional and unenforceable.266
The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the admitting
privileges requirement and the physical plant regulations solely on due
process grounds, finding that Whole Woman’s Health controlled its ruling.267
The district court found the opinion in Whole Woman’s Health to be so clear
on the unconstitutionality of admitting privilege requirements that it went so
far as to liken Missouri’s advocacy of these TRAP laws to an “attempt to
undermine Brown v. Board of Education.”268
In assessing the claims in the Eighth Circuit, Judge Shepherd addressed
each requirement separately.269 Beginning with the physical plant regulations,
the court did not agree with the lower court that a facial challenge to the
regulations was justiciable at that point in time.270 The Eighth Circuit,
interpreting Whole Woman’s Health similarly to the Fifth Circuit in June
Medical Services, focused on the burden component of the undue burden test
and emphasized the “fact-intensive nature of the constitutional test.”271 The
court found that there was not enough information in the record on how
flexible DHSS would be in allowing waivers to show whether the physical
plant regulations would actually amount to an undue burden.272 There was
only one previous instance of a request for a waiver in the record, so the court
found that a decision on the facial challenge was premature.273
The court further held that the district court committed an error of law
by making a decision on the facial challenge to the physical plant
regulations.274 Judge Shepherd reasoned that the district court “enjoined the
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regulations on the presumption that a DHSS Director would act less than
scrupulously on any waiver application,” and emphasized that “the good faith
of [state] officers and the validity of their actions are presumed.”275 After
Lyskowski, the foundation of this presumption seems questionable.
Moving to the next requirement at issue, Judge Shepherd held that the
district court also erred in enjoining the admitting privileges requirement
because “[it] did not apply the plain language of [Whole Woman’s Health v.]
Hellerstedt,” which, the court reasoned, requires courts to consider the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws confer.276 Explaining that Whole Woman’s Health did not find that
abortion was inherently safe in all states as a matter of law, Judge Shepherd
held that the district court was required to make factual findings on whether
the law was medically beneficial in order to adequately weigh benefits against
burdens, because that inquiry might yield a different result in Missouri versus
Texas.277 The district court discussed the complete lack of health benefit
conferred by the requirement, but the Court of Appeals read Whole Woman’s
Health to require a somehow more in-depth inquiry.278
Interestingly, both Hawley and June Medical Services involve this same
issue: the undue burden standard allows appellate courts to disregard the factfinding of lower courts, which are better suited to make burden
determinations. Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have taken the view that
the legislatures were motivated by something other than the obvious desire to
eliminate all access to abortion in their respective states, in the face of codified
legislative intents to do just that.

V. CONCLUSION
Even though the Columbia Health Center of PPKM succeeded in
keeping its license in the 2016 Lyskowski case, it ended up losing its license
in October 2018 after failing to meet the admitting privileges requirement.279
Lyskowski addressed the flagrant disparate treatment of PPKM by DHSS, but
it was not able to address the constitutionality of the DHSS requirements
themselves.280 Thus, the more insidious, long-term strategy implemented by
the Missouri Legislature has gone largely unchecked. While Missouri had

275. Id.
276. Id. at 757–58.
277. Id. at 758.
278. Id.
279. Erin Heger, ‘They’ve Moved the Goalpost’: How Missouri Lawmakers
Are Regulating Legal Abortion Out of Existence, REWIRE NEWS GROUP (June 3,
2019), https://rewire.news/article/2019/06/03/theyve-moved-the-goalpost-howmissouri-lawmakers-are-regulating-legal-abortion-out-of-existence/
[https://perma.cc/NPM3-PR8R].
280. See Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, 2016 WL 2745873, at
*1 (W.D. Mo. 2016).
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five abortion clinics in 2008, that number dwindled to one by 2020.281 As
further evidence of the strategy to completely end abortion in Missouri, DHSS
was recently involved in litigation over its failed attempt to deny the license
of Missouri’s sole remaining abortion provider.282 While the license of its
sole clinic remains intact, Missouri narrowly escaped becoming the first state
without a single abortion provider since 1974.
Planned Parenthood officials have been warning courts about this result
for years. The director of state media campaigns for Planned Parenthood,
Bonyen Lee-Gilmore, explained that “[t]his has been several decades’ worth
of work by politicians who are passing medically unnecessary restrictions and
working with their political appointees who enforce regulation. They have
picked off health center after health center, pushing care out of reach for far
too many people. This has been a slow chipping away, a long-term strategy
by anti-abortion forces in the state who have planned a long arc to this day.”283
Surely not having a single abortion facility in Missouri would amount to a
substantial obstacle to Missouri women seeking abortions, but the undue
burden standard, in its failure to meaningfully review legislative purpose
behind a restriction, has allowed for this gradual result while courts have
watched it happen.

281. Heger, supra note 279.
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